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How homogenous is the market for top managerial talent?  We analyse data from university annual 
reports on Vice Chancellors’ remuneration for the period 1995-2002 and test to see whether there is alignment 
between the market for Vice-Chancellors and the market for CEOs in Australia.  While the responsiveness of 
pay to institution size is not dissimilar, Vice-Chancellors receive on average about 60 percent less than CEOs.  In 
addition, we also compare the remuneration of Australian Vice-Chancellors to those in the United States and the 
United Kingdom and find that the Australians receive the highest real remuneration when using purchasing 
power parity exchange rates.  The remuneration of Australian Vice-Chancellors is even more attractive once 
taxation and quality of life factors are taken into consideration.  We also construct a demographic profile of 
Vice-Chancellors, showing that relative to CEOs, Vice-Chancellors are appointed later in life and do not have 
shorter tenures.  Regarding Vice-Chancellor backgrounds, there is an over-representation of Vice-Chancellors 
from social and pure sciences and an under-representation of Vice-Chancellors from management and commerce 
relative to the number of award completions in those areas. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
To what extent are universities becoming transformed into corporations?  Marginson 
and Considine (2000) find that the modern university as we understand it today can be 
thought of as an “enterprise university” characterised by corporate style executive leadership.  
There is greater pressure on universities to improve their corporate governance practices as 
they are under increasing revenue pressure to find external sources of funding in the face of 
federal funding cuts to higher education.  The tension lies in universities being seen as 
essential to the knowledge economy, yet the ability of universities to produce knowledge is 
threatened by funding cuts (Sargeant, 2001).  In turn, this has led to increased commercial 
pressure on universities as they look to other forms of funding.  An example of universities 
turning to the market is seen in the case of ANU, who are selling inflation indexed bonds to 
fund capital building projects (Morris, 2004).  Given this pressure and the “corporatisation” of 
universities, how much of the existing literature related to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
and firms is applicable to Vice-Chancellors and universities? 
 
How are universities responding to this pressure?  There is evidence suggesting that 
earnings quality for universities has improved over time, consistent with the theory that 
universities face increased pressure to become more like corporates and for greater public 
accountability as they seek to raise revenue from non-traditional sources.  Soh (2004) looks at 
two dimensions of earnings quality for Australian universities: one based on the adherence of 
financial statements to prescribed requirements and the second based on accruals and earnings 
persistence.  Although universities are nominally nonprofit organisations, there is evidence 
that they behave like companies and have incentives to avoid reporting negative earnings 
results.  Although the reporting practices of universities and companies do not seem as 
dissimilar as one may think, there is little evidence of opportunistic accruals earnings 
management occurring within universities. 
 
As the financial position of universities deteriorates due to commercialisation, their 
capacity to provide the public good aspect of their existence may be threatened, as they move 
toward more market oriented goals in order to be financially independent.  This raises 
interesting implications for the future of higher education in Australia as universities face 
increased corporatisation pressures.  In the extreme, universities will be viewed as providing 
private goods, with the public good perspective, such as having a well-educated and highly 
skilled population, being seen as having no substantial benefit (Lawrence, 2004).  If  
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universities become corporatised, it is also possible that their incentive becomes to generate 
the greatest private benefit to higher education (Butler, 2001).  While this may be seen in a 
negative light, it is possible that this move may be beneficial to universities, given the 
experience of private universities in the United States.  Already, total university revenue has 
grown from $5.5 billion in 1991 to $10.4 billion in 2002, equivalent to a compound average 
annual growth rate of 9.5 percent, reflecting the greater diversification of funding sources and 
movement toward more commercial practices over time (Nelson, 2002). 
 
How homogeneous is the market for top managerial talent?  Much research has been 
done to date on CEOs and firms, however very little has been applied to Vice-Chancellors and 
universities, particularly in an Australian context.  Swan (2001) comments on the disparity 
between remuneration in universities and firms in arguing that the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Sydney appears underpaid relative to the corporate model.  Clements (2002) 
points to the impact of the size of the university on Vice-Chancellor remuneration and 
examines whether there is any evidence of a Group of Eight effect, finding that membership 
to this group of institutions adds on average approximately $145,000 to Vice-Chancellor pay.  
In view of the importance of universities to society as a whole and the role of the Vice-
Chancellor in leading these institutions, we study the workings of the market for Vice-
Chancellors.  It is of interest to discover how the market for Vice-Chancellors operates to 
ensure that the market works efficiently.  This includes ensuring that the best individuals lead 
our universities, that universities do not waste resources (or overpay the Vice-Chancellor) and 
ensuring universities attract individuals with the necessary talent (and do not underpay for 
their services). 
 
The issue of executive remuneration is often surrounded by controversy.  For 
university Vice-Chancellors, there is often the same perception as in the private sector, that 
the remuneration packages of Vice-Chancellors are a sign of excess.  A recent (November 15, 
2004) article reported by CNN showed the spread of views on this topic.  Roger Bowen, 
general secretary of the American Association of University Professors (and a former 
University President) comments “I don’t underestimate the important work they do…but I 
think they’re starting to look more like CEOs than college presidents, and I think public trust 
is a real issue.”  The alternative view that the remuneration of these individuals is warranted, 
given the competition for leaders.  David Ward, president of the American Council on 
Education is of the opinion that “in the private sector you’d be paying four, five, six times  
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more for the same function”, which suggests that the remuneration of these executives is 
looking relatively “cheap” in comparison.  Jim Boyle, president of the College Parents of 
America believes that their salary packages are compensation for a strong leader who has the 
ability to hold tuition fees down in the long run (Associated Press, 2004). 
 
Certainly, the role of a Vice-Chancellor is complex, given the importance of these 
institutions to society as a whole, their size and the funds they have at their disposal.  To put 
this in perspective, the total revenue for all Australian universities for 2003 is approximately 
$12 billion (Department of Education, Science and Training, 2004a), representing 
approximately 12 750 1.6 percent ≈  of Australia’s GDP.  This is approximately equivalent 
to Australian livestock income ($12 billion), coal mining ($12 billion), less than that of oil 
and gas extraction ($19 billion) and metal ore mining ($19 billion) and approximately twice 
that of the gold ($5 billion) and iron industries ($5 billion) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2004a, 2004b; Trewin, 2004).
1  As a result, it is somewhat surprising that these issues have 
not been investigated extensively in prior research. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses the existing 
literature on executive remuneration in nonprofits, concentrating on Vice-Chancellors, section 
3 outlines the data used in the analysis, section 4 provides a profile of Vice-Chancellors, 
section 5 compares the remuneration of Vice-Chancellors in Australia to their counterparts in 
the United States and United Kingdom, section 6 compares remuneration between universities 
and companies, section 7 discusses further aspects of the market for Vice-Chancellors and 
section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Universities are a small subgroup of nonprofit organisations that all face the common 
difficulty of measuring performance.  Hallock (2002) looks at compensation of management 
in nonprofits and finds evidence of a size effect and a negative effect on top management 
compensation and the number of paid directors, suggesting substitution for managerial talent.  
Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) look at the structure of executive compensation in nonprofits 
                                                 
1 Grieg (1997) estimates that the total impact of the University of Western Australia’s expenditure on the output 
of Western Australia is approximately $470 million, which is equivalent to approximately $560 million in 2003 
dollars.  Calabu et al. (2000) estimate that the university sector contributes $10.6 billion or approximately 2 
percent of GDP, with an additional $9.3 billion of human capital generated per year and benefits to industry of 
approximately $2.2 billion, leading to a total sector wide economic impact of $22 billion per year (4 percent of 
GDP).  
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and find that for top executives, monetary compensation is higher compared to for-profits.  
However, contingent payments (bonus schemes) make up a smaller proportion of 
compensation compared to for-profits, which they argue reflects differences in the goals and 
incentives provided to the market for nonprofit managerial talent. 
 
Little has been done on the modelling of financial remuneration to Vice-Chancellors.  
Baimbridge and Simpson (1996) look at this for Vice-Chancellors at United Kingdom higher 
education institutions.  Explanatory variables include institutional and personal 
characteristics, drawing on the findings of Pounder (1989) that salaries are significantly 
influenced by institutional characteristics.
2  They find strongest support for personal 
characteristics that try to capture the individual knowledge of Vice-Chancellors (Becker, 
1962, 1964; Mincer, 1970, 1974; Medoff and Abraham, 1980, 1981) and some support for 
quantitative institutional factors.  Economic and geographical factors are also significant.   
Baimbridge and Simpson propose that this is suggestive of regionality in wage setting.  No 
factors capturing the quality of the institution are significant.  Interestingly, they find some 
evidence consistent with remuneration committees taking advantage of monopsony power in 
setting compensation, consistent with the findings of Ransom (1993) and Baimbridge (1995). 
 
Ehrenberg et al. (2001) look at United States college and university President
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remuneration from the perspective of the board of trustees who determine the structure of the 
package.  They look at what factors these trustees seem to price into compensation.  They find 
Presidents enjoyed an almost two-fold increase in salary relative to the increase of other 
faculty members.  They also document some evidence that Presidents of private institutions 
are paid more than their public counterparts.  In modelling the determinants of remuneration, 
they find results that are similar to those of Baimbridge and Simpson (1996).  In looking at 
the path to presidency, they find that Presidents who held a prior presidency receive a 
moderate pay increase per year of prior presidency.  Presidents who are members of the 
clergy are also paid less than other Presidents, all else constant.  The authors suggest that 
these Presidents are less motivated by market forces.  Institutional complexity also affects 
compensation, with Presidents of research or doctoral universities receiving higher 
compensation than other Presidents.  However when analysing the pay-performance relation, 
                                                 
2 See also Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) and Allen (1981). 
3 The CEO of universities in the British tradition (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc.) are known as “Vice-
Chancellors”, while in the United States they are known as “Presidents”.  
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they find that overall, there is a weak relationship between salary, compensation changes and 
institutional performance. 
 
The forerunners to Ehrenberg et al. are Pfeffer and Ross (1988) and Boulanger and 
Pliskin (1999) who explain differences in compensation across institutions.  However, these 
studies do not look at whether Presidents’ pay is structured to provide incentive alignment 
with that of the institution.  The findings are generally similar, with the interesting finding of 




Sorokina (2003) looks at the pay (not total remuneration) of college Presidents at the 
top private liberal arts colleges in the United States.  Due to their relatively small size 
(enrolments are usually below 2,500 students) and smaller executive, it is likely that the 
President has a larger influence on policies, so the pay-performance sensitivity is larger 
(Schaefer, 1998).  She finds limited evidence of this relationship compared to the evidence 
arguing for the existence of a relationship between pay and human capital variables.  She also 
finds evidence of gender discrimination but in the opposite direction to Pfeffer and Ross.  In 
light of her findings, Sorokina suggests that the relatively weak pay-performance relationship 
may be due to a stronger correlation with performance to benefits or other rewards not 
connected to pay (her analysis did not pick up this effect as she analysed pay only).  This 
highlights the importance of using a more extensive measure of rewards such as total 
remuneration or using alternative methodologies that capture the diversity in the role of the 
college President and different stakeholder relationships. 
 
Cornell (2002) compares the income of S&P 500 CEOs to that of Presidents of leading 
US private research universities.  He asks the questions: are private universities able to attract 
leaders with qualifications comparable to that of major corporate leaders and if so, how do 
they compensate and recruit these candidates?  Cornell finds that the backgrounds of 
Presidents are not inferior to those of the S&P 500 CEOs.  On the whole, it is difficult to 
argue that the calibre of Presidents is lower than that of CEOs.  When comparing 
remuneration, he finds that the average total compensation for CEOs is a multiple of 32-36 
times the average of the university President.  Additionally, the compensation of CEOs grew 
                                                 
4 See also Chapman and Wagner (1986).  
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faster than that of university Presidents.  In 1994, the ratio of CEO to university President 
compensation was 15.  In 2000, the ratio was 33.  This was driven by the much higher growth 
in CEO compensation relative to that of university Presidents.  Part of this increase is also due 
to the use of executive options for CEOs. 
 
The discrepancy between President and CEO compensation is so large that it is hard to 
argue that such a large differential is required to attract suitably qualified CEOs.  Cornell 
suggests that it may indicate that CEOs play major roles in the determination of their own 
remuneration packages, consistent with the skimming hypothesis of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2000).  That universities can also attract highly accomplished candidates at 
such a large discount relative to corporations also suggests that corporations may be able to do 
more to maximise shareholder wealth when recruiting and compensating CEOs.  It also 
suggests that there may be a need to extend traditional agency theory models of incentive 
alignment when applying this to the most senior positions.  The individuals in these positions 
are highly compensated relative to other positions and are likely to place more value on non-
pecuniary aspects of the job due to diminishing marginal utility of wealth.  While agency 
theory models ignore these factors, the ability of universities to recruit candidates who 
typically serve their institutions with energy, enthusiasm and dedication suggests that these 
other factors play an important role. 
 
One possible explanation for the large multiple between CEO and President 
compensation is that Presidents and CEOs may now be in different markets.  Whatever the 
reason for the huge discrepancy between President and CEO compensation, the evidence 
shows that universities have been able to attract accomplished candidates to the role of 
President, while paying less than 5 percent of the average CEO’s compensation.  The 
remuneration package is not designed to provide incentives, being largely fixed and 
independent of effort and results, yet universities expect that Presidents will expend best 
effort.  The assumption is that candidates are those who value the non-pecuniary aspects of 
the job and possess a sense of personal pride that provides the motivation to work hard and in 




SUMMARY OF MAJOR STUDIES OF REMUNERATION 
OF PRESIDENTS/VICE-CHANCELLORS OF UNIVERSITIES 
 Author  Findings 
1.  Pfeffer and Ross (1988)  Institutional type affects President pay.  Positive 
relationship between pay and length of tenure and 
size. 
Overall, a weak relationship between change in 
salary and management control variables. 
2.  Baimbridge and Simpson (1996)  Stronger relationship for personal than economic 
or institution factors. 
Vice-Chancellor remuneration is positively related 
to revenue, the number of academic subject 
categories and the average gross weekly earnings in 
the region.  Higher remuneration for Vice-
Chancellors with public honours or previous 
professorships. 
Negative relationship to average house prices.   
Lower remuneration the longer the period of 
incumbency, for those with science backgrounds or 
holding a Doctor of Science relative to a Bachelors 
degree. 
3.  Ehrenberg  et  al.  (2001)  Positive relationship between remuneration and 
length of tenure, holding of a prior presidency, higher 
average faculty salaries, endowments, enrolments and 
entry level scores. 
Presidents at research or doctoral universities 
receive higher compensation than those who are not.  
Presidents who are members of the clergy receive 
lower compensation. 
Overall, a weak relationship between changes in 
compensation and institutional performance. 
4.  Cornell  (2002)  CEO pay is 32-36 times that of President pay.   
CEO compensation has grown faster than that of 
Presidents, despite there seeming to be little 
difference in the calibre of individuals in these 
positions. 
5.  Sorokina  (2003)  Weak relationship between institution 
performance and pay.  Stronger relationship between 
performance and benefits not connected to pay. 
Positive relationship between pay and length of 
tenure.  More eminent Presidents are paid more and 
female Presidents are paid more than males. 
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3.  DATA 
University reporting requirements are governed by Australian Accounting Standards, 
the Guidelines issued by the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training 
(DEST) and the relevant state legislation governing the university.  In terms of Vice-
Chancellor’s remuneration, universities are required to disclose as a note to the accounts the 
aggregate amount of remuneration to all directors and the number of executives falling within 
each $10,000 band, commencing at $100,000 (Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 
1993; Australian Accounting Standards Board, 1997; Department of Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs, 2000). 
 
Data for this project is primarily sourced from university annual reports and financial 
statements.
5  The National Library of Australia holds most of the required annual reports, 




It is a requirement for any publication printed in Australia to be lodged at the National 
Library of Australia.  However, the onus for lodgement rests with the publishers and as was 
discovered, in the case of university annual reports, not all universities have done this.  La 
Trobe and Bond University, for example, have not lodged any copies of their annual reports at 
the National Library.  Other universities, for which the National Library catalogue records 
indicate reports are held, have not lodged the entire report; for example, the University of 
Queensland have neglected to lodge their financial statements in many instances.  Other 
institutions, such as the University of South Australia, have not lodged reports for all years.  
In an attempt to further fill gaps in the dataset, the State Library of New South Wales was also 
                                                 
5 Preliminary attempts to source data uncovered some difficulties in obtaining this dataset; namely that requests 
to universities generally resulted in poor results.  The common problems cited were (1) that copies of prior 
reports were not held, (2) that copies were held but not available for distribution, or (3) non-response.  Enquiries 
made to the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee (AVCC) also proved fruitless. An enquiry was made to the 
National Tertiary Education Union who responded with some data collected from annual reports, however this 
was not a complete dataset, as the majority of universities were excluded and the set only included data for three 
years.  The Auditor-General for Western Australia also held some copies of reports but their dataset was 
confined to universities in Western Australia.  Other enquiries made to DEST and the Western Australia 
Department of Education and Training were also unsuccessful, as they do not collect the data.  Due to time and 
financial constraints, it was not feasible to travel to each individual university to obtain the data from university 
library holdings.  Given that insufficient data was obtained from direct requests at each university, I visited the 
National Library of Australia in Canberra to obtain the required data. 
6 University annual reports for the year ended 31 December 2003 were in the process of being prepared and 
published at the time of data collection (July 2004).  As such, the majority of these reports were unavailable as 
they had not been lodged at the National Library, nor were they published on the majority of university websites.  
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visited.  After repeated requests to the universities themselves, some institutions also provided 
annual reports.  There are some notable anomalies in relation to the availability of data; for 
example, the University of Western Sydney has not lodged their 2002 report with the National 
Library or the State Library of New South Wales.  A search of the University of Western 
Sydney Library catalogue records also fails to locate a copy within the university’s own 
library!  A copy of the financial statements is not available from the University webpage. 
 
There is substantial variation in the quality and quantity of disclosure across 
institutions relating to Vice-Chancellor remuneration.  Institutions in Western Australia report 
relatively early while those in New South Wales and Queensland report relatively late.   
Overall, in terms of data, the set covers 37 institutions
7 over eight years (1995-2002), yielding 
a total of 37 8 296 ×=  theoretically available observations.  Of these, data availability 
constraints regarding Vice-Chancellor remuneration reduced the number of observations to 
179 across 34 of the 39 institutions in Australia, accounting for 60 percent of the total number 
of theoretically available observations.  Figure 1 shows the proportion of institutions with 
observations by year.  The figure shows that there is greater success in obtaining data for the 
period 2000-2002, reflecting the change in disclosure requirements requiring mandatory 
disclosure of remuneration that came into effect in 2000.  The institutions where remuneration 
data was not available are the University of South Australia, Bond University, Notre Dame 
University, Flinders University and Charles Darwin University.  The University of South 
Australia reports obtained did not include notes to the financial statements or an audit report, 
hence the required disclosures were not available and it would have been unclear if the figures 
could have been reasonably relied upon.  Bond University has not lodged copies of their 
annual report at the National Library.  They released the first publicly available report in 
2000
8 although the reports obtained did not include financial statements.  Notre Dame 
University has not lodged reports at the National Library of Australia and responded to all 
requests made directly to the university for their annual reports with the statement that “Notre 
Dame is a private university and doesn’t release annual reports or other financial 
statements…I have been asked to supply them [to others] over the years and the answer from 
our finance department is always no” (Oliver, 2004).  Flinders University has not lodged 
annual reports at the National Library of Australia for the years covered in the sample.   
                                                 
7 The institutions where no data has been collected are Notre Dame University and Flinders University. 
8 Available from the university homepage http://www.bond.edu.au/exec/council.htm.  Bond University 
commenced operations in 1989, hence for 11 years the annual reports have not been available to the public.  
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Charles Darwin University
9 has lodged reports at the National Library but remuneration is not 
disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.  It is possible that the variation in disclosure 
and the difficulty in obtaining this data reflects either a lack of demand from stakeholders for 
information or a ploy by the institution to deflect accountability (da Silva Rosa, 2004).  It 
appears that the first possibility is unlikely to drive the poor quality of disclosure, given that 
there has been considerable stakeholder interest for these institutions to increase disclosure.  
For example, in 2000, the New South Wales Auditor-General conducted a special review on 
Chief Executive Officer contracts (Audit Office of New South Wales, 2000) and in 2002 
Senator Carr asked questions in the Senate relating to how public resources were being used 
in universities.  With universities finding it increasingly difficult to avoid responsibility for 
their actions, it will be of interest to see if they improve the quality and quantity of their 
disclosures in the future. 
 
Figure 1 













In terms of the disclosure of Vice-Chancellor remuneration, the remuneration of the 
Vice-Chancellor was taken to be the midpoint of the top band reported.  Some cross-checks 
were made to ensure reasonableness of this assumption by obtaining the list of university 
Council members for reasonable assurance that the Vice-Chancellor would be the most highly 
paid executive
10.  Intuitively this would be expected if the Vice-Chancellor is taken to be the 
Chief Executive Officer of the institution.  The quality and consistency of the disclosures 
themselves, however, is questionable.  Some institutions include superannuation benefits 
while others exclude it and the structure of remuneration is, in the majority of cases, not 
                                                 
9 Formerly Northern Territory University (until 2004). 
10 It is possible that some academics may be paid more than the Vice-Chancellor, however this disclosure is not 
required.  
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disclosed.  No attempt was made to impute the superannuation contribution where this was 
excluded from the remuneration number disclosed, as Vice-Chancellors may voluntarily 
choose to contribute to superannuation more than that required under law.  Again, there were 
no means to verify whether or not this was the case.  It was also pointed out (Anonymous, 
2004) that some institutions also vary what is disclosed under the remuneration figure from 
year to year.  In some cases, certain non-cash fringe benefits will be included in one year and 
excluded in others.  In others, the remuneration paid for the year, rather than the total 
remuneration payable, will be disclosed.  This will distort the figures, particularly for those 
individuals who have only been present for part of the year.  Further, where termination or 
long service payments are made, this will inflate the figure for the period.  Table 2 shows the 
Vice-Chancellor remuneration by university and year.  Figure 2 is a plot of the remuneration 
of Vice-Chancellors in 2002.  The solid line represents the mean remuneration across all 
institutions for that year, while the dashed lines indicate plus and minus two standard errors.
11  
On this basis, the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Tasmania appears to be the most 
underpaid on a relative basis while the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Queensland 
appears most overpaid.  There is more than a hint of a “size effect” in this figure, and a more 
refined analysis of this issue is set out in Section 6. 
 
Qualitative information was also obtained by interviewing four Vice-Chancellors.   
These individuals may not be identified for confidentiality reasons, however the Vice-
Chancellors were not exclusively from Western Australia.  Some further information was 
taken from interviews with Vice-Chancellors published in the Education section of the 
Australian Financial Review on Mondays. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Monash University has been excluded from the calculation of the mean and standard errors as it is an outlier 
due to the resignation of the Vice-Chancellor in this year.  
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Table 2 
VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION BY INSTITUTION AND YEAR ($’000) 
 University 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002
1.  Australian  Catholic  University  195  225 - - - - - - 
2.  Australian  National  University  235 255 295 295 305 325 385 465 
3.  Central  Queensland  University  - - - -  325  305 -  265 
4.  Charles  Sturt  University  - - - - -  295  285  310 
5.  Curtin  University  of  Technology  215 245 185 175 265 365 425 365 
6.  Deakin  University  315 195 255 345 355 335 405 475 
7.  Edith  Cowan  University  165 165 185 210 270 275 345 395 
8.  Griffith  University  - - - - -  335  335 - 
9.  James  Cook  University  185 - - - -  245  275  295 
10.  La  Trobe  University  265 265 295 315 335 355 405 405 
11.  Macquarie  University  - - - - -  475  485  495 
12.  Monash  University  415 505 345 385 405 495 475  1,155 
13.  Murdoch  University  165 185 225 275 275 275 275 335 
14.  Queensland University of Technology  -  -  -  -  325  365  375  415 
15.  RMIT  275  305  305 - -  405  325  405 
16.  Southern  Cross  University  - - - - -  245  235  465 
17.  Swinburne  University  of  Technology  215 245 265 275 285 285 335 335 
18.  University  of  Adelaide  235 185 375 255 255 545  1,605 285 
19.  University  of  Ballarat  - 195 195 235 245 315 205 235 
20.  University  of  Canberra  195 255 265 265 275 275 275 385 
21.  University  of  Melbourne  455 215 315 345 405 385 455 505 
22.  University of New England  -  -  -  -  -  275  295  305 
23.  University  of  New  South  Wales  -  - 335 375 395 465 495 295 
24.  University  of  Newcastle  -  -  -  - 275 275 305 315 
25.  University  of  Queensland  - - - - -  645  645  705 
26.  University  of  Southern  Queensland  -  -  - 205 205 245 255 295 
27.  University  of  Sydney  - - - - -  465  495  495 
28.  University  of  Tasmania  -  -  -  - 295 295 305 225 
29.  University of Technology Sydney  -  -  -  -  255  275  315  395 
30.  University of the Sunshine Coast  -  -  -  -  -  -  275  265 
31.  University  of  Western  Australia  210 230 495 275 355 355 385 555 
32.  University  of  Western  Sydney  - - - - -  375  455 - 
33.  University  of  Wollongong  - - - - -  335  415  435 
34.  Victoria  University  -  - 295 295 275 290 305 455 
    
  Mean  249 245 289 283 304 350 402 411 
Source: University Annual Reports.  
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Figure 2 
VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION, 2002 





















4.  WHO ARE THE VICE-CHANCELLORS AND HOW LONG DO THEY LAST? 
This section provides a “demographic profile” of Vice-Chancellors.  By examining 
their education, age at appointment and length of tenure, we show that a fairly well-defined 
picture of the typical Vice-Chancellor emerges. 
 
Table 3 shows the educational backgrounds of Vice-Chancellors by broad field of 
education and compares them to the proportion of award course completions as reported by 
the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) for the period 1993-2002.   
Details on the educational background of Vice-Chancellors were obtained from Who’s Who in 
Australia, biographies provided by University Vice-Chancelleries and also from the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee (AVCC).
12  Figure 3 shows the under or over-
representation of Vice-Chancellors by background relative to the proportion of award 
completions.  The further the deviation from the 45 degree line, the greater the over or under-
representation.  Points to the right of the 45 degree line (Society and Culture, Natural and 
Physical Sciences) show an over-representation while those to the left of the 45 degree line 
show an under-representation of Vice-Chancellors relative to the proportion of award 
completions. 
                                                 
12 The data provided by the AVCC contained considerable errors and gaps; when cross-checked, approximately 
87 percent (84 of 97) of the listed disciplines were incorrect.  
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Table 3 
BACKGROUNDS OF VICE-CHANCELLORS 
(Percentages) 
Broad Field of Education  Award Completions  Vice-Chancellors 
Natural and Physical Sciences  7.08  40.21 
Information Technology  6.85  .00 
Engineering and Related Technologies  5.67  7.22 
Architecture and Building  2.02  1.03 
Agriculture, Environmental and Related Studies 2.18  4.12 
Health 12.99  11.34 
Education 13.76  7.22 
Management and Commerce  24.00  2.06 
Society and Culture  19.78  40.21 
Creative Arts  5.63  2.06 
Food, Hospitality and Personal Services  .02  .00 
Mixed Field Programmes  .01  .00 
Source:  Awards: Department of Education, Science and Training (2004b).  Vice-Chancellors: Who’s Who 
in Australia, AVCC, University Vice-Chancelleries. 
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Source: Who’s Who in Australia, AVCC, University Vice-Chancelleries. 
 
From Table 3, Vice-Chancellors with a background in natural and physical sciences or 
society and culture are over-represented relative to the proportion of award completions in 
those fields.  The disparity is most stark for the pure sciences, with the difference being more 
than fivefold, while for social sciences the difference is twofold.  Vice-Chancellors from these 
backgrounds interviewed believed that their background helped them in the role by teaching 
them pragmatism.  In addition, science was thought to be of benefit to academic 
administration through its focus on solutions and answers, teaching investigative skills,  
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gathering data, analysing it, coming to conclusions and the associated implications as well as 
the ability to manage complex concepts.  There is an under-representation of Vice-
Chancellors with backgrounds in information technology (none) and management and 
commerce (a twelve-fold difference) relative to the number of award completions.  This is 
somewhat surprising, given that the role of Vice-Chancellor is one of management and due to 
the corporatisation of universities, requires commercial expertise.  During the course of 
interviews with Vice-Chancellors, it was observed that these individuals identified a need to 
understand and be comfortable with using and interpreting financial statements and data.  The 
lack of Vice-Chancellors with information technology backgrounds may reflect the relatively 
recent emergence of this field of study compared to the age at which most Vice-Chancellors 
are appointed (discussed below).  These results may also reflect the opportunity cost of 
postgraduate study relative to the earnings potential foregone, given that Vice-Chancellors 
tend to have some form of postgraduate qualification (most commonly a PhD).  However, it is 
interesting to note that the results presented are not inconsistent with those found by Siegfried 
(1997), where US presidents with an economics background (social sciences) are over-
represented relative to the number of undergraduate degrees awarded and has been increasing 
over time.  He suggests that this may be due to the perception that those individuals with 
economics backgrounds are more likely to realise the constraints on resources. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the location of the educational institution where Vice-
Chancellors received their Bachelor and postgraduate qualification.  Panels B and C split this 
into internally versus externally appointed Vice-Chancellors (i.e. if the Vice-Chancellor 
was/was not appointed from the staff of the same institution), while Panel D looks at the 
location of the postgraduate institution conditional on the location of the Bachelor institution.  
The table is to be read in a “columnwise” manner; thus, looking at Panel A, for example, we 
see that 64 percent of Vice-Chancellors have Bachelor degrees from an Australian university, 
while the remaining 36 percent obtained their Bachelor degrees from a foreign institution.  
Breaking this down into internal versus external appointments, a higher proportion of internal 
appointments tend to have a domestic Bachelors qualification; when looking at the location of 
their postgraduate institution, regardless of whether the candidate is an internal or external 
appointee, the situation does not differ substantially between the two.  Panel D shows that 
Vice-Chancellors who received a domestic Bachelors qualification are roughly evenly split 
between choosing to stay in Australia versus going overseas for their postgraduate 
qualification.  However, those Vice-Chancellors who have a foreign Bachelors qualification  
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are three times as likely to also obtain their postgraduate qualification from a foreign 
institution as an Australian institution.  Perhaps these individuals are imported into Australia 
for their careers in Australian universities. 
 
Most Vice-Chancellors in Australia are appointed in their 50s.  Panel A of Figure 4 
shows the age distribution of Vice-Chancellors when appointed.  Approximately 88 percent of 
Vice-Chancellors take on the role by age 60 while only about 15 percent have assumed the 
role by age 50.  This is an important consideration for the motivation of potential candidates 
who aspire to the role of Vice-Chancellor. 
 
Table 4 
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF VICE-CHANCELLORS 
(Percentages) 
Location Bachelor  Postgraduate 
 
Domestic 63.8  39.4 
Foreign 36.2  60.6 
Total 100.0  100.0 
  
 
Domestic 75.9  41.4 
Foreign 24.1  58.6 
Total 100.0  100.0 
  
 
Domestic 56.7  37.3 
Foreign 43.3  62.7 
Total 100.0  100.0 
  
 
Postgraduate   Bachelors 
   Domestic  Foreign 
Domestic   48.3  23.5 
Foreign   51.7  76.5 
Total   100.0  100.0 
Source: Who’s Who in Australia, AVCC, University Vice-Chancelleries. 
 
Panel B of Figure 4 splits the age distribution to investigate whether there is a 
difference between the ages of internally versus externally appointed Vice-Chancellors.  The 
mean age of internally appointed Vice-Chancellors is 55.0 years versus externals at 54.3  
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years, a difference that is not significant at conventional levels.
13  It appears that the process 
of Vice-Chancellor appointment in Australian institutions is not consistent with the learning 
hypothesis, where internals are appointed at a younger age relative to externals, as the 
institution is better able to assess the capabilities of the candidate and therefore has a greater 
information set regarding the managerial expertise of the individual.
14 
 
Vice-Chancellors spend approximately six years in the post, on average, before 
turnover.  Their length of tenure seems to be dependent on the age of appointment, with Vice-
Chancellors appointed at an earlier age having longer tenure, as shown in Figure 5.
15  For 
every later year in age that a Vice-Chancellor is appointed, the average tenure falls by 
approximately .4 years or between four and five months.  For example, consider a person 
aged 50 who commences as a Vice-Chancellor.  Then, according to the estimated regression 
equation of Figure 5 his/her expected tenure in the job is  .40 50 27.81 7.8 − ×+ ≈ years.  The 
mean tenure of Vice-Chancellors is 5.8 years (panel C, Figure 4).
16  Linking tenure with 
turnover, the average age of Vice-Chancellor turnover in Australia is 61.  This follows 
intuitively; if the average age of appointment is 55 years (from Panel A of Figure 4) and given 
the average tenure is 6 years (Panel C, Figure 4) then the average age of turnover is 
55 6 61 +≈  (panel D, Figure 4). 
 
Most turnovers occur after the age of 60; only 39 percent of Vice-Chancellors have 
left their post by age 60 and as shown in Panel E of Figure 4, half of all Vice-Chancellors are 
turned over by age 61.  Once past sixty, there is a small window during which the majority of 
Vice-Chancellors leave their role; 63 percent of Vice-Chancellors have left by age 62.  This 
reflects the relatively late age at which Vice-Chancellors are appointed. 
 
                                                 
13 The t-statistic is for the difference is .55 (p-value .29). 
14 The learning hypothesis has been used in the literature on CEO remuneration; see, for example, Murphy 
(1986). 
15 To construct Figure 5, we compute the average tenure of all Vice-Chancellors of a given age of appointment 
and then plot this average against age. 
16 The slight discrepancy between the mean length of tenure in panel C of Figure 4 (5.8 years) and Figure 5 (6.0 
years) is due to the different number of observations used to construct the Figures.  Figure 5 has 57 observations 
(versus 60 for Figure 4) as details on age, while not necessary to construct Figure 4, were required to construct 
Figure 5.  
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Figure 4 
AGE DISTRIBUTION, TENURE AND TURNOVER FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS 
 
A.  Appointment: All 
Observations = 89
Mean = 54.5
Median =  54.0
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B.  Appointment: Internals versus Externals 
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Mean = 55.0                      Mean = 54.3
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Source: Who’s Who in Australia, AVCC, University Vice-Chancelleries. 
 
How do Australian Vice-Chancellors’ demographics compare to those of Australian 
CEOs?  The two roles are similar in that they are both senior management roles.  However, 
they differ in the structure of remuneration, risk, stress and job satisfaction.  CEO 
remuneration is typically made up of four components: salary, bonus, options and other 
benefits (Murphy, 1999).  Bonuses are typically based on financial measures such as earnings.  
Options are a form of long term incentive for the CEO.  In the case of Vice-Chancellors, 
options are not feasible due to these institutions not having an identifiable market price and 
shares.  Additionally, bonuses based on financial measures are unlikely to capture the non-
financial aspects of institution performance. 
 
The risks faced by CEOs and Vice-Chancellors are closely related to their tenure in 
the role, although the nature of these risks differ.  CEOs face more a more explicit onus to 
maximise shareholder value while the case for Vice-Chancellors is not so clear.  Additionally, 
while CEOs may be disciplined for poor performance by the market for corporate control or 
their shareholders, universities have government support and lack clearly defined ownership 
boundaries between their different stakeholders.  The stresses of the two jobs are similar, with 
more firms now being concerned about the non-financial aspects of operations and 
universities more concerned about the financial aspects of their operations, although Vice-
Chancellors are often subject to more complex relationships with their stakeholders than 
CEOs.
17  In addition, Vice-Chancellors must also deal with the importance of maintaining 
                                                 
17 The nature of the risk associated with being a Vice-Chancellor can be illustrated by the following four 
instances where Vice-Chancellor turnover has been associated with universities in crisis; namely the turnover of 
Vice-Chancellors at RMIT, the University of New South Wales (UNSW), Monash and the University of  
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academic credibility, which is not so important to the majority of firms.  Finally, the 
satisfaction derived from the job is likely to be different between the two roles.  It is highly 
probable that Vice-Chancellors derive greater enjoyment from the non-pecuniary aspects of 
the role than CEOs, given the public good dimension to universities. 
 
Looking at academic qualifications, 83 percent of CEOs have some sort of academic 
qualification, compared to 100 percent of Vice-Chancellors.  Only 6 percent of Australian 
CEOs hold some sort of post-graduate qualification as opposed to the entire sample of Vice-
Chancellors, reflecting the different nature of the two groups.  Regarding age of appointment, 
CEOs are appointed at younger ages than Vice-Chancellors.  Over 90 percent of CEOs 
assume the position by age 55, with the majority of appointments occurring between the ages 
of 41 to 55.  In contrast, the mean age of Vice-Chancellor appointment is just under 55 years.  
The older age at which Vice-Chancellors tend to be appointed may reflect the importance of 
seniority in promotion in academia relative to the private sector.  However, average tenure is 
dependent on the age of appointment for both Vice-Chancellors and CEOs, with the 
sensitivity being similar for both CEOs and Vice-Chancellors.  For both groups of top 
management, for each additional year’s increase in age that the individual is appointed to the 
post, the average tenure declines by .4 years.
18  Panel A of Figure 6 shows the age distribution 
for CEO appointment while Panel B shows tenure across age of appointment. 
 
In terms of tenure and turnover, a much publicised study looking at CEO turnover for 
ASX 200 companies in 2002
19 found that the average tenure for CEOs leaving office is 4.4 
                                                                                                                                                          
Adelaide.  The recent resignation of Professor Ruth Dunkin at RMIT appears to have been imminent for some 
time, with Victorian Education Minister Lynne Kosky calling for the Vice-Chancellor’s resignation as early as 
2001 (Tomazin and Guy, 2003).  UNSW has experienced three Vice-Chancellors in two years, all of which have 
been associated with the loss of Council support for the Vice-Chancellor (Cooper, 2004).  In August 2001, the 
Vice-Chancellor at the University of Adelaide, Professor Mary O’Kane, resigned following loss of support from 
senior management (Crewther, 2003).  Finally, turnover at Monash University of Vice-Chancellor Professor 
David Robinson occurred in July 2002, after it was discovered he had plagiarised text in books published earlier 
in his career.  Although the Council unanimously passed a vote of confidence in Professor Robinson a month 
prior to his resignation, following the plagiarism allegations, the situation did an about-turn, as students and staff 
called for his resignation (Monash University, 2002).  Despite these instances dealing with situations of intense 
pressure, at a minimum, they call into question the view that the role of a Vice-Chancellor is not risky.  Vice-
Chancellors are in the public domain with their activities and performance monitored and calls made for 
improvement or resignation when judged sub-standard.  Despite performance being an ill-defined concept for 
universities, the public does appear to be able to differentiate between actions perceived as good or bad and are 
vocal in voicing their disapproval.  In contrast to CEOs who are accountable predominantly to their shareholders, 
Vice-Chancellors are accountable and must answer to a wider group incorporating the different stakeholder 
interests in the university. 
18 For CEOs, this holds only for those appointed after the age of 31. 
19 The sample includes 178 companies from the top ASX 200, of which 22 organisations experienced CEO  
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years, almost half of the global average of 8.6 years (Booz Allen Hamilton and Business 
Council of Australia, 2003).  The shorter tenure may indicate that in Australia, top 
management are under greater pressure to perform and those in the private sector who fail to 
do so are disciplined by the market for corporate control.
20  However, Lieu (2003) finds that 
average tenure of all CEOs is 5.8 years, the same as that for Vice-Chancellors (panel C, 
Figure 4).  The age distribution of CEOs leaving their post also shows that turnover occurs at 
younger ages for CEOs relative to Vice-Chancellors, with most CEOs leaving between the 
ages of 51 to 60 years.  More than 85 percent of CEOs are replaced by age 60, while the mean 
age of turnover for Vice-Chancellors is 61.  The age distribution of CEO turnover is shown in 
Panel C of Figure 6. 
 
Overall, relative to Australian CEOs, Vice-Chancellors are more highly educated, 
appointed at older ages and do not have shorter tenure.  This may reflect differences in 
demand and supply for top management in the market for Vice-Chancellors versus that of 
CEOs.  On the supply side, the older age of Vice-Chancellor appointment relative to CEOs 
may reflect the opportunity cost of obtaining postgraduate qualifications.  On the demand 
side, the costs involved in identifying a suitable individual for the role of Vice-Chancellor 
may be higher than that for a CEO, hence there is a tendency for these individuals to hold 
longer tenures.  Alternative explanations may also include greater difficulty in monitoring and 
evaluating Vice-Chancellors relative to CEOs or the lack of market forces disciplining Vice-
Chancellors for poor performance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
turnover in 2002. 
20 CEOs seen as not meeting Board expectations have an average tenure of 3.6 years (Business Council of 
Australia, 2004).  CEO turnover in Australia was found to be disproportionately driven by merger activity, 
accounting for 21 percent of all turnover, versus 14 percent globally.  
22 
Figure 6 
AGE DISTRIBUTION, TENURE AND TURNOVER FOR CEOs 
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5.  AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF VICE-CHANCELLORS 
In this section, we compare the remuneration of Vice-Chancellors in Australia to their 
counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom.  This entails issues such as, is the 
market for Vice-Chancellors local or global?  Is the market well arbitraged across countries?  
The analysis uses the approach of Ong and Mitchell (2000)
21, who argue that what is relevant 
when comparing remuneration is the purchasing power of income.  Using current exchange 
rates to compare remuneration is inappropriate because purchasing power differentials 
between countries are only reflected in exchange rates in the long run.  A more meaningful 
measure is real Vice-Chancellor remuneration in each country. 
 
The relative price index used is the Big Mac index.  This is appealing as the Big Mac 
is representative of a standard basket of goods and services, being made to the same recipe in 
over 100 countries around the world.  While the Big Mac index is not a perfect measure of 
purchasing power parity due to frictions such as barriers to trade caused by transportation 
costs, trade restrictions and taxes, differences in the cost of non-traded goods and different 
pricing methods (Pakko and Pollard, 2003), it has been found to be surprisingly accurate in 
tracking exchange rates in the long term (Ong, 2003).  Table 5 shows the Big Mac Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP). 
 
Table 5 
THE BIG MAC INDEX, 2002 
     Actual  Exchange   
  Big Mac price  Big Mac PPP  Rate (local currency  Under/Over 
Country  Local currency  in US$  in US$  cost of US$1)  valuation (%) 
United States  US$2.49  2.49  -  -  - 
Australia A$3.00  1.61  1.20  1.86  -35 
Britain £1.99  2.89  0.80  0.69  16 
Source: The Economist, 25 April 2002. 
                                                 
21 Remuneration data for United Kingdom Vice-Chancellors is from the Times Higher Education Supplement for 
the 2001/2002 year (published in the Times Higher Education Supplement on 7 February 2003).  Remuneration 
refers to the year ended 31 July 2002 and includes salary and other benefits but excludes superannuation 
contributions made by the university.  The data covers 162 institutions.  Remuneration data for United States 
Presidents is sourced from the Chronicle of Higher Education for the 2001-2 year.  The data covers private 
college Presidents only and is taken from the Form 990 that each institution is required to file with the Internal 
Revenue Service and includes pay (defined as salaries, fees, bonuses and severance payments) and benefits 
(including health and pension plans) as well as other fringe benefits that are required to be counted as income by 
the Internal Revenue Service.  In addition, deferred compensation paid or designated in the year is also included.  
Cases where the institution did not provide information for a particular category have also been included in the 
dataset.  There are 594 observations in the dataset.  Remuneration data for Australian Vice-Chancellors is 
sourced from university annual reports for the year ended 31 December 2002.  There are 30 observations in the 
dataset.  
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From Table 5, in the United States US$1 of earnings buys 12 . 4 9 . 4 0 ≈  Big Macs, 
whereas in Australia, A$1 buys 13 . 0 0 . 3 3 ≈  Big Macs.  Accordingly, to compare earnings in 
the two countries in terms of Big Macs, the purchasing power of US$1 relative to A$1 is 
about .4 .3 1.33 ≈ .  From the second last column of Table 5, US$1 costs A$1.86, so we see 
that on the basis of the Big Mac Index the Australian dollar is substantially undervalued – the 
last column of the Table reveals that it is undervalued by 35 percent, while the British pound 
is overvalued by 16 percent.  A Vice-Chancellor would have to earn A$1.20 to maintain the 
same purchasing power in Australia for every dollar earned in the United States.  Using the 
market exchange rate would overestimate the cost of living in Australia relative to that in the 
United States.  One weakness of this analysis
22 is that there is no control for size differences 
across institutions as the data is not readily available.  The United States is used to standardise 
as a benchmark.  The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the difference in real remuneration between countries.  The 
final row of panel A reveals that Vice-Chancellors in Australia are the highest paid with real 
remuneration that is 43 percent higher than in the United States.  However, the Vice-
Chancellors in the United Kingdom have 31 percent less purchasing power relative to the 
United States.  This indicates that Vice-Chancellors are the lowest paid in the United 
Kingdom and the highest paid in Australia.  It is possible that the differential reflects that 
Australian Vice-Chancellors are better than those in the United States or United Kingdom.  
Alternatively, the remuneration differences may reflect differences in the size of the 
institutions.  The standard errors are also higher in Australia than the United States or the 
United Kingdom which suggests that in Australia there is more dispersion in size across 




Panel C of Table 6 highlights the fallacy of using market exchange rates to compare 
remuneration across countries.  If market rates are used, it appears that Australian Vice-
Chancellors are slightly underpaid relative to the United States, as are Vice-Chancellors in the 
United Kingdom, although the extent of underpayment for the latter falls to 20 percent.  If the 
medians are used, a different picture emerges; Australian Vice-Chancellors receive marginally 
                                                 
22 Monash University is excluded for Australia as this is an outlier due to the resignation of the Vice-Chancellor 
in 2002. 
23 As the standard error is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of observations.  
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(3 percent) higher remuneration relative to the United States, while Vice-Chancellors in the 
United Kingdom receive lower remuneration, but the extent of the underpayment is less 
severe at only 10 percent.  However, using market rates means that these figures do not reflect 
purchasing power as cost of living differentials between countries are reflected in exchange 
rates only in the long run.  Another problem is that due to the high volatility in exchange 
rates, the comparison is subject to substantial noise and inaccuracy.  Figure 7 brings out the 
differences in using PPP exchange rates versus market rates to compare remuneration across 
countries.  It shows that the cross-country dispersion of remuneration is higher when PPP is 
used.  This is in contrast to the usual argument that currencies of rich countries tend to be 
overvalued relative to PPP such that incomes in these countries are overestimated, while those 
in poor countries are underestimated.  The result is that international inequality is 
overestimated when market exchange rates are used (Clements and Lan, 2004). 
 
Table 6 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF VICE-CHANCELLORS’ REMUNERATION 
  Australia  United States  United Kingdom 
A.  Expressed in US PPP dollars 
Mean 320,242  224,220  154,401 
Median 323,700  203,697  157,658 
Standard Error  16,253  5,599  2,730 
Mean as a percentage of the US 143  100  69 
      
B.  Local currency 
Mean A$385,833 US$224,220  £123,397 
Median A$390,000 US$203,697  £126,000 
Standard Error  A$19,582 US$5,599  £2,181 
      
C.  Expressed in US dollars at market exchange rates 
Mean 207,437  224,220  178,926 
Median 209,677  203,697  182,700 
Mean as a percentage of the US 93  100  80 
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In addition to remuneration, a Vice-Chancellor also needs to consider the taxation 
arrangements in each country.  One may be better off going to a country with lower 
remuneration but lower taxes than a country with higher remuneration and taxes.  A modest 
attempt at examining this issue is contained in Table 7 which shows an index of gross and net 
wages for 2003, from UBS (2003).
24  This shows that, on average, taxes and other 
contributions take up a higher proportion of gross salaries in Chicago, Los Angeles and 
London than in Sydney.  Wage deductions are similar in Los Angeles and London.  Taking 
taxes and other social contributions into account, Vice-Chancellor remuneration in Australia 
is even more attractive, relative to the United States and United Kingdom. 
 
                                                 
24 The index is constructed from unpublished data provided by UBS.  The index uses the hourly wage averaged 
across the wages for primary school teachers, bus drivers, automobile mechanics, construction workers, 
machinists, cooks, department managers, electrical engineers, bank tellers, secretaries, saleswomen and female 
textile workers.  
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Table 7 
INDEX OF GROSS AND NET WAGES, 2003 
Country  Gross Wages  Net Wages  Tax 
Chicago 100.00  72.92  27.08 
Los Angeles  92.91  69.88  23.03 
London 79.86  56.01 23.85 
Sydney 50.22  36.28  13.94 
Source: UBS  (2003). 
 
Another consideration for a Vice-Chancellor is the quality of life.  A Vice-Chancellor 
may choose to trade off remuneration for other benefits offered by a particular country.  To 
compare quality of life, the Quality of Life Survey produced by Mercer Human Resource 
Consulting is used.
25  This ranks countries on political, social, economic and environmental 
factors, personal safety and health, education, transport and other public services.  Scores are 
standardised against New York as the base city with an index of 100.  Results are shown in 
Table 8.  While this index is surely imperfect, it suggests that of the cities in the sample, 
Australia is the best place to live overall with the highest quality of life measures relative to 
the United States and United Kingdom.  Moreover, it appears that the United States and the 
United Kingdom have a similar quality of life. 
 
Table 8 
QUALITY OF LIFE RANKINGS, 2002 
City Country Index 
Chicago United  States  100.0 
New York  United States  100.0 
Boston United  States  100.0 
London United  Kingdom  100.0 
Sydney Australia  105.5 
Melbourne Australia  104.0 
Perth Australia 103.0 
Brisbane Australia  102.0 
Adelaide Australia  101.0 
Source:  Mercer Human Resource Consulting (2003). 
                                                 
25 Mercer surveys 235 cities worldwide based on 39 factors in 10 categories (political and social environment; 
economic environment; socio-cultural environment; medical and health considerations; schools and education; 
public services and transport; recreation; consumer goods; housing and natural environment) to provide tangible 
values for qualitative perceptions to allow objective assessments of the quality of living (Mercer Human 
Resource Consulting, 2003).  
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Overall, it appears that Vice-Chancellors in Australia are remunerated on the best 
terms, relative to their counterparts in the United States and United Kingdom.  Not only do 
they have higher real salaries, their remuneration is also more attractive once taxation and 
social security deductions are considered.  In addition, they also enjoy a higher quality of life.  
This analysis indicates that there is considerable variation in the way Vice-Chancellors are 
remunerated internationally.  This finding leads to interesting further questions, such as, why 
is the market for Vice-Chancellors not well arbitraged internationally?  In the future, can we 
expect to see more people from overseas becoming Vice-Chancellors in Australia?  However, 
at least two qualifications to the analysis in this section need to be kept in mind.  Firstly, there 
is no control for differences in institution size.  Further, there are no controls made for cross-
country differences in quality of either institutions or Vice-Chancellors. 
 
6.  ARE VICE-CHANCELLORS PAID LIKE CEOs? 
In a university, the Vice-Chancellor is seen as the Chief Executive Officers.  This 
raises an interesting question: how broad is the market for executives?  Does the one market 
encompass both CEOs from the private sector and Vice-Chancellors?  Although universities 
are traditionally viewed as nonprofits, compared to the profit motive of the corporation, are 
Vice-Chancellors remunerated on the same basis as their corporate counterparts?  Forces exist 
that are driving the corporate and university models to converge; firstly, there is funding 
pressure on universities as public funding declines as a proportion of total revenue.  The 
mechanism of funding allocation also creates pressure to attract students, analogous to firms 
looking to increase revenue by increasing their customer base.  Universities are now finding 
that they have to take charge of their finances in order to ensure that they remain financially 
viable, with the implication that the Vice-Chancellor now has to take a more commercial view 
of the institution’s activities.  For firms, as corporate governance and social responsibility 
becomes an increasing focus, they have had to consider the interests of non-owner 
stakeholders.  As a result, the two models are moving away from the extremes of the 
distribution toward one another. 
 
In this section, we compare Vice-Chancellor to CEO remuneration drawing on past 
research that has identified size as the key driver of remuneration in the corporate sector 
(Murphy, 1999).  Baimbridge and Simpson (1996) find that revenue is positively and 
significantly related to Vice-Chancellors’ remuneration in the United Kingdom.  Note that we 
are deliberately using only one variable here due to the data availability problems with  
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universities.  Revenue is used as a proxy for size as it is available for universities (and 
companies).  Vice-Chancellors are regarded as the CEOs of these institutions so it is of 
interest to see if there is any consistency between these two markets in terms of remuneration 
setting.  Consider the following model: 
 
( ) it 0 1 2 it it it logy log revenue D =β +β +β +ε , i universities and companies ∈ . (1) 
 
In this equation, for institution i in year t ,  it y  is the remuneration of the Vice-Chancellor or 
CEO and  it ε  is a disturbance term.  The independent variable used here is revenue in year t , 
as this variable makes sense both as a corporate and university measure that may be related to 
remuneration.  To control for the effects of inflation, remuneration and revenue are expressed 
in constant 1996 dollars.  D  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for Vice-
Chancellors and 0 otherwise.  Accordingly, equation (1) controls for the size of institutions 
(universities and companies) by holding revenue constant and then says that relative to CEOs 
in the private sector, the logarithmic difference of Vice-Chancellors’ remuneration is  100 γ×  
percent. 
 
Table 9 gives the results of estimating the variants of equation (1).
26  Figure 8 shows 
the results from panel B of Table 9.  Prominent observations above and below the regression 
line for universities are also shown.  It is perhaps not surprising that each of these correspond 
to a year in which Vice-Chancellor turnover occurred with the remuneration figure including 
termination payments.
27  If the coefficient on revenue is constrained to be the same for 
companies and universities, then an unambiguous measure of the discount to universities can 
be obtained.  Figure 8 and panel B of Table 9 show this: relative to CEOs, the logarithmic 
difference of Vice-Chancellors is 90 percent lower, which translates into a percentage 
discount of about 60 percent.  All coefficients are highly significant. 
                                                 
26 The data for CEO remuneration is from Lieu’s (2003) Honours dissertation on Australia’s participation in the 
global market for CEOs.  It includes firms among the top 125 in Australia (ranked by market capitalisation) 
during the years 1999-2003.  Remuneration has been pro-rated for a full year of work, in the case that the CEO 
left the position mid-way through the year.  For CEOs paid in foreign currency, remuneration has been converted 
to Australian dollars based on the rate as at annual reporting date.  The sample consists of 124 company years 
and 179 university years. 
27 When the Vice-Chancellor/CEO remuneration model is re-estimated to control for turnover, the results show 
that turnover is not associated with significantly higher remuneration (for more detail, see Soh, 2004).  
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Table 9 
VICE-CHANCELLOR VERSUS CEO REMUNERATION 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable/Coefficient Value 
2 R   df 
A.   () ()
company university
it 0 1 2 3 it it it it logy log revenue log revenue D =α +α +α +α +ε  
Intercept   0 α   8.59 (.37)  
()
company log revenue   1 α   .39 (.03)
 
()
university log revenue   2 α   .27 (.05)
 
it D   3 α   .75 (.74) .76 299 
B.   ( ) it 0 1 2 it it it logy log revenue D =β +β +β +ε  
Intercept   0 β   8.95 (.33)  
( ) log revenue    1 β   .37 (.02)  
it D    2 β   -.90 (.07) .76 300 
C.   ( ) it 0 1 2 it 3 it it it logy log revenue D Go8 =γ +γ +γ +γ +ε  
Intercept   0 γ   8.82 (.35)  
( ) log revenue    1 γ   .38 (.02)  
it D   2 γ   -.86 (.08)  
Go8   3 γ   -.10 (.09) .76 299 
F statistic for  12 α= α is 4.97 (p-value .03). 
 
The slope coefficient of .37 represents the elasticity of remuneration to revenues.  As 
it is less than one, it implies that there are economies of scale to remuneration – an institution 
that is 10 percent larger will pay its CEO 3.7 percent more.  Murphy (1999) calculates this 
elasticity using S&P 500 CEO salaries and bonuses; for the period 1990-1996 the elasticity is 
.21.
28  It is of interest that the two numbers are comparable in magnitude.  What is the 
marginal effect on remuneration of an increase in size?  As the elasticity of remuneration with 
respect to revenue is .37, the marginal effect  PR ∂ ∂  in universities is  ( ) .37 P R .41 =  if we 
use sample means.  In other words, if an institution were to increase its revenues by one 
thousand dollars, the corresponding average increase in remuneration is 41 cents. 
 
Cornell (2002) in a study on US Presidents finds that CEO pay is 32-36 times that of 
                                                 
28 This is calculated as the average of the elasticity of compensation with respect to sales revenue for each 
industry group.  
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President pay.  Why is there such a large discount and why do we not see more discontent 
from Vice-Chancellors about this?  This finding suggests that the market for Vice-Chancellors 
is segmented from the market for CEOs in Australia and internationally (Merhebi et al., 
2003).  It also suggests that there are large differences in goals and incentives provided in the 
market for university managerial talent, consistent with Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999).   
Panel C of Table 9 shows that after controlling for revenue, membership of an institution to 
the Group of Eight has no significant effect on remuneration.
29  This suggests that the key 
driver of remuneration is size rather than reputational considerations. 
 
Table 10 and Figure 9 give the average over time of the residuals from the model in 
panel A of Table 9 converted into percentages for each institution; this represents the average 
percentage over/underpayment to the Vice-Chancellor relative to what is expected on the 
basis of size.
30  As we use the model with the university dummy included, we are comparing 
remuneration in each university with the all-university average; this means that the measure of 
the over/under payment is zero on average.  Hence, relatively speaking, Vice-Chancellors at 
the University of Technology Sydney are, on average, the most underpaid, while those at the 
University of Queensland are the most overpaid.  Some qualifications to this conclusion are 
appropriate, firstly, that these relativities are made exclusively on the basis of size.   
Additionally, there may be legitimate reasons for the deviations from the curve, for example, 
reflecting differences in quality, experience and effectiveness of Vice-Chancellors across 
institutions. 
                                                 
29 Panel C of Table 9 includes a Group of Eight dummy variable that is equal to one if an institution is a member 
of the Group of Eight and zero otherwise. 
30 When the model is re-estimated to control for turnover (see Soh, 2004), the rankings for relative 
over/underpayment of Vice-Chancellors do not change substantially and the coefficient on the turnover variable 
is not significant.  The effect of adding a turnover control is to decrease (increase) the magnitude of the average 
relative over/underpayment for institutions where turnover has (not) occurred.  Overall, there does not appear to 
be any evidence of systematically large termination payments associated with Vice-Chancellor turnover.  
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Figure 8 
VICE-CHANCELLOR VERSUS CEO REMUNERATION: THE UNIVERSITY DISCOUNT 
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OVER/UNDER PAYMENT OF VICE-CHANCELLORS 
 Institution  Percent  Institution  Percent
1.  University of Technology Sydney  -19.0 18. Victoria University  1.3
2.  Curtin University of Technology  -16.4 19. La Trobe University  2.6
3.  Australian National University  -14.0 20. Deakin University  3.6
4.  Edith Cowan University  -12.4 21. University of New England  4.9
5.  James Cook University  -11.8 22. University of Western Australia  5.9
6.  University of Newcastle  -8.8 23. QUT  6.2
7.  RMIT  -7.7 24. Central Queensland University  6.2
8.  University of Melbourne  -7.2 25. University of Sydney  10.2
9.  University of Southern Queensland  -6.7 26. University of Canberra  13.6
10. University of Tasmania  -5.4 27. University of Wollongong  21.4
11. University of New South Wales  -5.3 28. University of Western Sydney  22.8
12. Murdoch University  -5.0 29. Southern Cross University  24.7
13. Swinburne University of Technology -3.5 30. Monash University  27.2
14. Australian Catholic University  -2.5 31. University of Adelaide  37.9
15. Charles Sturt University  -1.7 32. University of the Sunshine Coast  38.1
16. Griffith University  -1.4 33. Macquarie University  44.8




























Overall, when comparing remuneration across universities and companies, for a 
similar sized institution, there is a remuneration differential depending on whether the 
institution is a company or a university, with Vice-Chancellors accepting a discount of 60 
percent relative to their private sector counterparts.  This is illustrated by the regression line 
for universities lying everywhere below that for companies.  This suggests that top 
management remuneration does not appear to be set on a similar basis across universities and 
companies. 
 
7.  FURTHER RESULTS 
Other aspects of this market investigated include the determinants of Vice-Chancellor 
tenure, appointment and the modelling of the determinants of Vice-Chancellor remuneration.  
Here we provide a brief overview of this additional material; for a more in depth analysis, see 
Soh (2004). 
 
There is weak evidence that average length of Vice-Chancellor tenure appears to be 
increasing over time, with an increase in each year of calendar time leading to an increase in 
the length of average tenure of 9 percent.  There is some evidence that age is a determinant of 
tenure, with older Vice-Chancellors spending a shorter time in the role, although the effect is 
small in magnitude, with an additional year in age leading to a 7 percent decrease in the  
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length of tenure.  However, earnings of the university do not appear to be significant 
determinants of tenure, suggesting that there is little evidence of a link between the financial 
performance of an institution and the length of time spent in office. 
 
Vice-Chancellor appointment does not appear to follow a tournament theory-like 
process, where outsiders are handicapped relative to insiders.
31  There is little evidence of 
“culture effects” at these institutions, with institutions where the former Vice-Chancellor was 
an external appointment not significantly more likely to appoint another external over an 
internal.  While tournament theory suggests that the more staff at an institution, the greater the 
potential pool of internal applicants from which to draw upon and the greater the handicap to 
outsiders, institutions with more staff are equally as likely to appoint an external or internal 
Vice-Chancellor.  Additionally, there appears to be no significant Group of Eight effect where 
these institutions favour external over internal appointments. 
 
Modelling the determinants of Vice-Chancellor remuneration, the period of 
incumbency is significant and the size of the institution, measured by total assets, weakly so.  
A 10 percent increase in total assets leads to a 1.4 percent increase in Vice-Chancellor 
remuneration.  This is consistent with the private sector model, where CEO remuneration is 
driven by size (Murphy, 1999).  It is also consistent with Leone and van Horn (1999) who 
find that executive compensation in nonprofits increases by moving from smaller to larger 
organisations.  The marginal effect of an increase in total assets evaluated at the means is .07; 
in other words, if an institution increases its asset base by one thousand dollars, Vice-
Chancellor remuneration increases (on average) by 7 cents. 
 
In contrast to Baimbridge and Simpson (1996), there is a positive relationship between 
the period of incumbency and remuneration.  The relationship is consistent with human 
capital theory where the longer the period spent in the position, the more experienced and 
productive is the worker and the higher the reward.  A positive relationship between the 
length of time as Vice-Chancellor and remuneration is consistent with the accumulation of 
valuable institution-specific human capital by the Vice-Chancellor.  In this instance, it may be 
advantageous for an institution to retain this institutional knowledge by encouraging the Vice-
Chancellor to stay by offering higher remuneration.  Sorokina (2003) finds a positive and 
                                                 
31 For more information on tournament theory, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Lazear (1995), Chan (1996) and 
Agrawal et al. (2003).  
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significant relationship between pay and tenure, with Presidents receiving approximately .4 
percent higher pay for each year of tenure.  For Australian Vice-Chancellors, an additional 
year of tenure leads to an increase in remuneration of approximately 2 percent.  This may 
reflect Australian Vice-Chancellors accumulating institution-specific human capital at a faster 
rate relative to United States Presidents, making them more valuable to the institution over 
time. 
 
Sorokina finds that female Presidents are paid more than their male counterparts, with 
an average gender differential of 8 percent.  The Australian experience shows that there do 
not appear to be appreciable differences in remuneration between the genders.  This suggests 
that the labour market characteristics correlated with gender are not appreciably different in 
Australia.  Another possible explanation may be that there is less competition for female 
Vice-Chancellors in Australia relative to the United States.  Additionally, there appear to be 
no regional effects in remuneration setting and research capacity and student enrolments do 
not appear to significantly affect remuneration.  This suggests that the market for Vice-
Chancellors in Australia is national rather than local and while universities strive to improve 
their research capabilities and student numbers, this does not appear to have an impact on the 
remuneration of the Vice-Chancellor.  If an analogy is drawn to the corporate setting, neither 
research and development nor the customer base appear to be priced factors in top executive 
remuneration setting.  Further, in contrast to the corporate situation, there appears to be no 
significant relationship between performance (measured by earnings) and compensation. 
 
8.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
What is so special about a university?  Summers (2003) argues that part of the answer 
is that the most valuable assets of a university are not its physical capital, but the people in the 
community and the knowledge they possess.  Another is the less formal, decentralised 
environment of the university where guidelines and resources are provided in order to create 
environments where individuals can do their best work.  Summers comments that the 
nurturing of the development and flow of ideas is what the success of today’s firms is 
dependent upon and that they could benefit by adopting some aspects of this culture.  The 
ability of universities to encourage and reward creativity and novel thinking is partly how 
universities add value to society.  By allowing ideas to reign supreme, universities position 
themselves to be able and ready to respond to new challenges.  Perhaps it is in this that 
universities have stood the test of time.  
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We see that a well-defined image of the typical Vice-Chancellor emerges.  It appears 
that there is an over-representation of Vice-Chancellors in Australia from natural and physical 
science and society and culture backgrounds and an under-representation of Vice-Chancellors 
from management and commerce and information technology backgrounds.  This may reflect 
the opportunity cost of postgraduate study in each respective area, given that the Vice-
Chancellors in the sample all have postgraduate qualifications. 
 
Regarding where Vice-Chancellors studied to obtain their qualifications, it appears 
that the majority of Vice-Chancellors obtained their undergraduate qualification in Australia 
before choosing to go overseas for their postgraduate qualification.  This situation holds 
regardless of whether the sample is split into internally versus externally appointed Vice-
Chancellors.  However, Vice-Chancellors who obtained their undergraduate qualification in 
Australia are almost equally as likely to go overseas as to remain in Australia for their 
postgraduate study, while those who obtained their Bachelors qualification from a foreign 
institution are three times as likely to also undertake postgraduate study overseas than in 
Australia. 
 
Comparing Australian Vice-Chancellors to their counterparts in the United States and 
United Kingdom, Australian Vice-Chancellors clearly top the stakes.  Not only is the real 
purchasing power of their remuneration higher by 43 percent measured according to the Big 
Mac index, the tax considerations are more favourable and the quality of life in Australia 
exceeds that of the United States and United Kingdom.  Vice-Chancellors in the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, appear to be the losers in the international comparison, with 
lower real remuneration and a less favourable tax situation.  This may be an important 
consideration for potential future Australian university Vice-Chancellors currently residing 
overseas.  It may also reflect that Australian Vice-Chancellors are of higher quality, on 
average, than their international counterparts, although it must be emphasised that the 
comparisons are made purely on the basis of remuneration only, with no controls for size 
differences between institutions. 
 
Comparing the remuneration of Australian Vice-Chancellors to Australian CEOs, 
while the sensitivity of remuneration to size is similar, those individuals accepting the role of 
Vice-Chancellor receive, on average, a discount of 60 percent relative to the private sector.   
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This is consistent with the disparity found between United States Presidents and CEOs.  It 
appears that the market for Vice-Chancellors is separate from the market for CEOs, despite 




What are the implications of the corporatisation of universities?  Firstly, it seems 
plausible that increased pressure for accountability may result in greater pressure for VCs to 
perform and greater incentive alignment so that in the future, we may see evidence of 
performance driven turnover in this sector.  Secondly, Vice-Chancellor remuneration may 
increase to a level more comparable to CEOs, if they are indeed regarded as the CEOs of 
these institutions.  However, the two markets may never meet if the goals of the two segments 
are divergent enough to keep these markets distinct.  Given that universities are classified as 
non-profit organisations with complex stakeholder relationships and multiple objectives and 
the difficulty in obtaining meaningful measures of certain outcomes in a university context, it 
is possible that the disparity in the way top executives are remunerated between firms and 
universities will persist. 
 
Overall, it appears that while there is considerable convergence between the role of 
Vice-Chancellors relative to CEOs, the labour market does not appear to be pricing Vice-
Chancellors on the same basis as CEOs.  Perhaps this dates back to the roots of universities as 
public nonprofit institutions, although the evidence would suggest that Australian universities 
have in reality moved away from this traditional view. 
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